Situation V: Treatment of Neutral Merchantmen by unknown
International Law Studies – Volume 7 
International Law Situations with Solutions and Notes 





















The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the U.S. 
government, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the Naval War College.  
SITUATION v. 
\'Tar exists bet,veen the United States and State X. 
Neutral merchant vessels bound for a fortified port of 
State X and loaded for the most part 'vith contraband are 
overtaken on the high seas by vessels of the United States 
Navv. 
Some of these neutral merchant vessels are unsea-
'vorthy, son1e are overtaken at points too far from a prize 
court to make it advantageous to send the vessels in, 
others can not be cared for 'vithout impeding the action 
of the United States naval forces, which are in danger of 
immediate attack, and in other cases prize cre,vs can not 
be spared to take the captured neutral merchantn1an to 
a prize court. 
\Vhat action may be taken by commanders of vessels 
of the United States Navy in such cases? 
SOLUTION. 
(a) If the contraband cargo and the seized neutral ves-
sel have different o'vners, the contraband cargo, after 
proper survey, appraisal, and inventory, and with con-
sent of the master, if in accordance 'vith treaty provi-
sions, may be taken, and the vessel, if guilty only of the 
carriage of contraband, should be dismissed and the 
papers relating to the whole transaction should be for-
warded to the prize court. 
(b) If the n1aster does not consent the vessel and cargo 
are liable to the usual penalties for contraband trade. 
(c) If the neutral vessel and contraband cargo belong 
to the same o'vner the contraband cargo may be treated 
as in (a). The vessel, however, should, if possible, be 
sent to a prize court for adjudication, otherwise the ves-
sel should be dis1nissed. 
(d) Destruction, on account of military necessity, of 
a neutral vessel guilty only of the carriage of contraband 
entitles the owner to fullest compensation. Before de-
struction all persons and papers should be placed in 
safety. 
74 
DISCUSSION IN 1905. 75 
NOTES OX SITUATIOX Y. 
Discussio·n in 1905.-'l'opic IV, considered by the ~a val 
,~v ar College in 1905, 'vas as follows: 
Should the destruction of captured yessels be allowed before 
adjudication by a prize court? If so, under wba t condition? 
rrhe conclusion of the Conference ,,as as follo,vs : 
Enen~JJ vessels.-If there are controlling reasons why enen1y 
vessels may not be sent in for adjudication, as unseaworthiness, 
tbe existence of infectious disease, or the lack of a prize crew, 
they may be appraised and sold, and if this can not be done they 
may be destroyed. The imminent danger of recapture would jus-
tify destruction, if there was no doubt that the vessel was good 
prize. But in all sucb cases all the papers and other testimony 
should be sent to the prize court, in order that a decree may be 
duly entered. 
Keutral vessels.-If a seized neutral Yessel can not for any rea-
son be brought into port for adjudication, it should be dis1nissed. 
(Naval \\:rar College, International Law Topics and Discussions, 
1905, pp. 62-76.) 
The discussion in 1906 ".,.as more particularly concerned 
with the conditions under which enemy Yessels n1ight 
be destroyed. 
In 1905 it was said: 
The destruction of a neutral ship n1ust be clearly distinguished 
from the destruction of a belligerent ship eYen under the prin-
ciples at present generally accepted. If the belligerent's Yessel 
is good prize it may be lost to that belligerent from the tilne when 
his opponent captures it. This is not always neces~arily the 
case, because it n1ay be recaptured or a court for some reason 
may not conden1n the yessel. "Quarter-deck courts" should 
be a voided, except in extreme instances, even in deciding on the 
destruction of enemy vessels. Such Yessels 1nay have neutral 
cargo, \vhicll may be in no way in\olYed in the hostilities. The 
principle of the Declaration of Paris tba t " neutral goods, with 
the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture 
under the enemy's flag" may be involved in such a manner as 
to make great caution necessary in destroying Yessels of the 
enemy before adjudication. 
l\Iuch greater care should be taken before destroying a neutral 
vessel itself. (Ibid, p. 72.) 
In Topic IV, 1905, attention ''as particularly directed 
to the conditions under 'vhich ene1ny Yessels n1ight be 
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destroyed. In Situation \T of 1907 it is the purpose to 
give son1e,vhat n1ore consideration to the treatment of 
cargoes on neutral Yessels and to the treatinent of neutral 
vessels the1nsel Yes. 
)Iany grounds ha Ye been put for,varcl as sufficient 
:for the destruction of private Yessels that have been 
seized in ti1ne of 'var. Fro1n the phraseology of the 
rules that haYe been drawn up :from time to time it 
would seen1 that it had not entered. the n1inds of so1ne 
writers that a neutral vessel could under any circum-
stances be destroyed before condemnation by a prize 
court. 
Restriction on n~oven1ents of vessels with prize.-When 
prizes could be brought into neutral ports the question 
of destruction 'vas not particularly pressing, as sale in 
a neutral port 'vas a possibility, or in case of unsea-
worthiness refitting could be undertaken there. 
)lost neutral states at the present time :forbid the 
entrance to their ports o:£ war Yessels of the belligerents 
with prize. The following are exa1nples of the prohibi-
tions: 
.An Italian royal decree of June 16, 1895, says: 
ART. 12. Foreign ships of war and merchantmen armed for 
cruising are forbidden to bring IH'izes into, or to arrest and 
sparch Yessels in, the territorial sea or in the sea adjacent to the 
Italian islands, as well as to commit other acts which constitute 
an offense to the rights of state soyereignty. 
Great Britain in 1898 and in 190± prohibited the en-
trance of prize. 
Anned shir>s of either belligerent are interdicted from carry-
ing prizes made by them into the l)Orts, harbors, road~teads, or 
waters of the lJnited Kingdom, the Isle of :\Ian, the Channel 
Islands, or any of Her :\Iajesty's colonies or possessions abroad. 
!~ranee allo,Yed the entrance of 'var Yessels 'vith prize 
in 1898 and in 1904. 
'l'he GoYernmeut decides in addition that no sllip of war of 
either belligerent will be J)ermitted to enter and to remain with 
her prizes in the harbors and anchorages of France, its colonies 
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and protectorates, for more than twenty-four hours, except in the 
case of forced delay or justifiable necessity. 
No sale of objects gained from prizes shall take place in the 
said harbors and anchorages. 
Regulations as to destruction of seized vessels.-The 
regulations of different states in regard to the destruction 
of seized Yessels vary. The British regulations are 
rather n1ore definite than those of 1nost other states. 
In regard to destruction of captured vessels the British 
. A .. dmiralty l\Janual of Prize La'v of 1888 n1akes clear dis-
tinction bet1Yeen the treatment of neutral and of ene1ny 
vessels. 
303. In either of the following cases: 
(1) If the Sun·eying Officers report the Yessel not to be in a 
condition to be sent into any port for Adjudication; or 
(2) If the Commander is unable to spare a Prize Crew to na vi-
gate the Vessel to Port of Adjudication, the Con1mander should 
release the Vessel and Cargo without ransom, unless there is 
clear proof that she belongs to the Enemy. 
304. But if in either of these cases there be clear proof that 
the Vessel belongs to the Enemy, the Commander should re1nove 
her Crew and Papers, and, if possible, her Cargo, and then destroy 
the Yessel. The Crew and the Cargo (if saved) should then be 
forwarded to a proper Port of Adjudication in charge of a Prize 
Officer, together with the Vessel's Pa11ers and the necessary 
Affidavits. .A.Inongst the Affidavits should be one, to be made by 
the Prize Officer, exhibiting the evidence that the Ves~el belonged 
to the Enen1y, and the facts which rendered it impracticable to 
send her in for Adjudication. (Page SG.) 
The French Instructions 0 omplementaires of 1870 
grant great freedom in the treatment of neutral property. 
ART. 20. Si nne circonstance n1ajeure for~ait nn croiseur ii 
detruire une vrise, parce que sa conservation compromettrait sa 
sf·cnrite on le succes de ses operations, il devrait a voir so in de 
consern•r tons les papiers du bord et autres elen1ents necessaires 
pour per1nettre le jugement de la prise et l'ctablissement des in-
deinnites a attribner aux neutres dont la propriete non confiscable 
aurait ete detruite. On ne doit user de ce droit de destruction 
qu'avec Ja plus grande reserve. 
The instructions issued by the United States in 1898 
(General Order~ No. 492) 1nake no distinction between 
neutral and enemy vessels seized as prize. 
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2~. If there are controlling reasons why vessels may not be 
sent in for adjudication, as unseaworthiness, the existence of in-
f~etious disease, or the lack of a prize crew, they may be ap-
vrai~ed and sold: and if this can not be done tbeJ· may be de-
stroyed. The iunniuent danger of reeapture "·onld justify destruc-
tion, if there was no doubt tba t the vessel was good prize. But, 
in all snch cases, all the papers and other testimony should be 
S('ll t to the prize court, in order tba t a decree may be duly entered. 
'fhe ]{ussian Prize Regulations of March 25, 1895~ 
rnake no (_listinction in the trea t1nent of detained vessels, 
''" het her ene1ny or neutral vessels. 
21. In extraordinary cases, when the preservation of a detained 
YE-ssel proves impossible in consequence of its bad condition or 
extremelr small value (sic), the danger of its recapture by the 
enemy, or the considerable distance or blockade of the ports, as 
well as of danger threatening the detaining ve~sel or the suc-
cess of its operations, the ll<l val commander is vennitted, on his 
pC'rsonal responsibility, to burn or sink the detained vessel after 
having first taken all the peo]1le off it, and as far as possible the 
cargo on board, nnd also after ba ving taken measures for pre-
serving the documents and other objects on board, and which 
might proYe essential in elucidating 1natters when the case is 
examined according to the 1nethod prescribed for 11rize cases. 
(U. S. Foreign Relations, 190-1, p. 738.) . 
The Japanese regulations issued during the Chino-
Japanese war of 1894 provide: 
.ARTICLE 18. After detention, the cotnmaiHler should as soon as 
possible himself bring the vessel to the port where the prize court 
is, or the port nearest the prize court. 
If the state of things renders it necessary, he may order the 
officer who secured the vessel. (art. 14) or another officer to em-
bark on board and bring the vessel to the above-named port. 
ARTICLE 19. If the quantity of provisions, the state of the 
'veather, or other circumstances render it necessary, the com-
nwndcr may call at the nearest port. \Yben the circumstances 
ndn1it, be should as soon as possible go to the port stated in 
tt rticle 18. 
ARTICLE 20. \Yhen the commander finds that the detained ves· 
sel is unfit to be sent to the port stated in article 18, or when the 
commander is not able to send a crew to the vessel for the pur-
pose of bringing her to the above-named port, or when he finds 
the cargo is unfit to be sent to that port, the commander may 
bring tbe vessel to the nearest port to where he is, and may act 
as the state of things permits him. 
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In this case the commander should cause a survey thereof to 
be made by the officers of his ship the best qualified for the duty, 
and the surveying officers should report in writing the details of 
the matter to the commander, and the commander should forward 
the report to the prize court. 
When the commander causes the cargo to be sold, the affidavit 
w.ay be in Form No. 4. In other cases, in which the detained 
Yessel is brought to the nearest port, the affidavit may be in Form 
No.5. 
In the above-mentioned. case, if the vessel is not an enemy's 
vessel, the conunander should release the vessel after confiscation 
of the contraband goods. 
ARTICLE 21. The sale may be made in any neutral port where 
the local authorities n1ay be willing to allow the sale to take 
place. 
ARTICLE 22. If the enemy's vessels are unfit to be sent to a port, 
as stated in article 18, the commander should break up the vessels, 
after taking the crew, the ship's papers, and the cargo, if possible, 
into his ship. The crew, the ship's papers, and the cargo should 
be sent to a port, as stated in article 18. (Takahashi, Interna-
tional Law During the Chino-Japanese War, p. 183.) 
The Japanese regulations of ~farch 7, 1904, are much 
more general i:r: character. 
ARTICLE XCI. In the following cases, and when it is unavoid-
able, the captain of the man-of-war may destroy a captured vessel, 
or dispose of her according to the exigency of the occasion. But 
before so destroying or disposing of her he shall transship all per-
sons on board and, as far as possible, the cargo also, and shall 
presen'e the ship's papers and all other documents required for 
judicial examination: 
1. "\Vhen the captured vessel is in very bad condition and can 
not be navigated on account of the heavy sea. 
2. 'Yhen there is apprehension that the vessel may be recap-
tured by the enemy. 
3. "Then the man-of-war can not man the prize without so re-
ducing her own complmnent as to endanger her safety. 
AI~TICLE XCII. In the cases of the above article the captain of 
the man-of-war shall direct the prize officer to prepare a certifi-
cate stating the circumstances of inability to send in the prize 
and the details of her disposal, and to send it to the nearest 
prize court, toget_her with persons and cargo removed from the 
vessel, the ship's papers, and all other documents required for 
judicial examination. 
These regulations have not received the same interpre-
tation in all cases. 
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Oppenheim says: 
Japan, which according to article 20 of her prize law of 1894 
o1·dered her captors to release neutral prizes after confiscation of 
their contraband goods, in case the Yessels can not be brought into 
a port, altered her attitude in 1904, and allowed in certain cases 
the destruction of neutral prizes. (2 International Law, p. 471, 
sec. 431.) 
Of the above statement J. B. ~1oore says: 
A close scrutiny of article 20 of the Japanese prize law of 1894 
seems scarcely to bear out this statement. The article does not 
in terms embrace Yessels not brought in, but refers to cases in 
which the prize was, in conformity with article 18, brought in, 
if not to the port where the prize court sits, then, in conformity 
with article 19, to the port nearest the place of capture; and in 
tl!is relation it proYides: " In the above-mentioned cases, if the 
Yessel is not an enemy's Yessel, the commander should release 
the Yessel after confiscation of the contraband goods." 
A stronger implication, to the effect stated by Oppenheim, might 
ha.ve been drawn from article 22 of the prize law of 1894, which 
rf'ads: " If the enen1y's Yessels are unfit to be sent to a port as 
stated in article 18, the commander should break up the Yessels, 
after taking the crew, the ship's papers, and the cargo, if possible 
into his ship. The crew, the ship's papers, and the cargo should 
be sent to a port as stated in article 18." (7 ~Ioore, Interna-
tional Law Digest, p. 524.) 
The Instructions to Blockading Vessels and Cruisers 
issued by the United States June 20, 1898 (General Order 
No. 492) , states : 
24. The title to property seized as prize changes only by the 
decision rendered by the prize court. But, if the Yessel itself, 
or its cargo, is needed for immediate public use, it may be con-
verted to such use, a careful inventory and appraisal being made 
by impartial persons and certified to the prize court. 
British cases and opinions.-Professor Holland, in a 
letter to the Times, London, referring to the Russian 
rules, also refers to several cases. 
The Actaeon, an American ship, in 1814, under British 
license, was destroyed by the British war _ship La Hogue. 
The captain of La Hogue could not spare a prize crew to 
send the Actaeon to port and did not deem it 'vise to allow 
the Actaeon to proceed, as she might disclose the position 
and strength of his force. He therefore destroyed the 
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Actaeon with her cargo. The court decided that while 
the action of the British captain might be meritorious as 
toward his own Government, it might not properly entail 
loss upon the innocent o'vner. 
Lastly, it has been said that Captain Capel could not spare 
men from his own ship to carry the captured vessel to a British 
port, and that he could not suffer her to go into Boston, because 
she would have furnished important information to the Americans. 
These are circumstances which may have aff~rded very good rea-
sons for destroying this vessel, and may have made it a very meri-
torious act in Captain Capel as far as his own Government is 
concerned, but they furnish no reason why the American owner 
should be a sufferer. I do not see that there is anything that can 
bf· fairly imputed to the owner as contributing in any degree to 
the necessity of capturing or destroying his property, and I think, 
therefore, that he is entitled to receive the fullest compensation 
from the captor. (2 Dodson's Admiralty Report, p. 48. The Felic-
ity, Ibid., p. 381, stated in International Law Topics and Discus-
sion, Naval War College, 1905, p. 63.) 
In 1855 Doctor I.Jushington gave his opinion in the case 
of the Le?.tcade. 
The destruction of a vessel under hostile colors is a matter of 
duty; the court may condemn on proof \Vhich \vould be inadmis-
sible or \Yholly irregular in the instance of a neutral vessel. It 
may be justifiable or even praiseworthy in the captors to destroy 
an enemy's vessel. Indeed, the bringing to adjudication at all of 
an enemy's vessel is not called for by any respect to the enemy 
proprietor where there is no neutral property on board. But for 
totally different considerations, which I need not now enter upon, 
where a vessel under neutral colors is detained, she has the right 
to be brought to adjudication according to the regular course of 
proceeding in the pri?.:e court; and it is tb~ very first duty of the 
captor to bring it in, if it be practicable. 
From the performance of this duty the captor can be exonerated 
only by showing that he \vas a bonn /ide possessor, and that it was 
impossible for llin1 to discharge it. No excuse for him as to 
inconvenience or difficulty can be admitted as between captors and 
clain1ants. If the ~hip be lost, that fact alone is no answer; the 
captor must show a valid cause for the detention as well as for 
the loss. If the ship be destroyed for reasons of policy alone, as 
to maintain a blockade or othenvise, the claimant is entitled to 
costs anrl damages. The general rule, therefore, is that if a ship 
u1~der neutral colors is not brought to a competent court for 
adjudication, the claimants are, as against the captor, entitled 
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to costs and damages. Indeed, if n captor doubt his power to 
bring a nflutral Ye~sel to adjudiea tion, it is his duty, under ordi-
nary circumstances, to release h~r. {Spink's Admiralty Reports, 
2J7.) 
These 13ritish cases see1n to some to adn1it the right o£ 
destruction of neutral vessels under circumstances of 
graYe necessity under penalty not 1nerely of restitution of 
value but of costs and damages. 
In his letter to the London Times dated August 1, Pro-
fessor Holland thus co1nments upon the practice: 
There is no doubt that by the Russian regulations of 1895, ar-
ticle 21, and instructions of 1901, article 40, officers are empow-
ered to destroy their prizes at sea, no distinction being drawn 
between neutral and enemy property, under su.ch exceptional cir-
cumstances as the bad condition or small value of the prize, risk 
of recapture, distance from a Russian port, danger to the im-
perial cruiser or to the success of her 011era tions. Tlle instruc-
tions of 1901, it may be added, explain that an officer "incurs 
no responsibility whateYer" for so acting if the captured vessel 
is rea11y liable to confiscation and the special circumstances im-
peratiYely demand her destruction. It is fair to say that not dis-
similar, though Jess stringent, instructions were issued by France 
in 1870 and by tile United States in 1898; also that, although the 
French instructions expressly contemplate "l'etablissement des 
indemnites a attribuer aux neutres," a French prize court in 1870 
refused compensation to neutral owners for the loss of their 
property on board of enen1y ships burnt at sea. 
The question, howeYer, remains whether such regulations are 
in accordance with the rules of international law. The state-
nlent of these rules by Lord Stowell, who speaks of them as 
" clear in principle and established in practice,'' nu1.y, I think, be 
summarized as follows: An enemy's ship, after her crew has been 
placed in safety, may be destroyed. 'Vhere there is any ground 
for beJie·dng that the ship, or any part of her cargo, is neutral 
property, such action is justifiable only in cases of "the gravest 
importance to the captor's own state," after securing the ship's 
papers and subject to the right of neutral owners to receive full 
compensation. (Actaeon, 2 Dods., 48; Felicity, lb., 381; sub-
stantia11y followed by Dr. Lushington in Lcucade, Spinks, 221.) 
It is not the case, as is alleged by the "A"uvoe Vremya, that any 
British regulations "contain the same provisions as the Russian" 
on this subject. On the contrary, the Admiralty ~Ianual of 1888 
allows destruction of enemy vessels only, and goes so far in the 
direction of liberality as to order the release, without ransom, of 
a neutral prize which, either from its condition or from lack of a 
prize crew, can not be sent in for adjudication. The Japqnese in-
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structions of 1894 permit the destruction of only enemy vessels; 
and article 50 of the carefully debated "Code des prises" of the 
Institut de Droit International is to the same effect. It may be 
worth while to add that the eminent Russian jurist, 1\1. de 1\Iar-
tens, in his book on international law, published some 20 years 
ago, in mentioning that the distance of her ports from the scenes 
of na Yal operations often obliges Russia to sink her prizes, so 
that "ce que les lis maritimes de tons les etats considerent 
comme un moyen auquel il n'y a lieu de recourir qu'a la deniere 
extremite, se transformera necessairement pour nons en regie 
normale," foresaw that "cette mesure d'un caractere general 
soulevera indubitablement contre notre pays un mecontentement 
universe!." (The Times, August 6, 1904.) 
Lord Landsdowne, in a communication sent to the Brit-
, ish ambassador at St. Petersburg, August 10, 1904, pro-
tests against the destruction o:f neutral ships (cited in 
Topic IV, 1905): 
The position, already sufficiently threatening, is aggravated by 
the assertion on behalf of the Russian Government that the captor 
of a neutral ship is within his rights if he sinks it, merely for the 
reason that it is difficult, or impossible, for him to conYey it to a 
national port for adjudication by a prize court. We understand 
that this right of destroying a prize is clain1ed in a number of 
cases; among others, when the conYeyance of the prize to a prize 
court is inconvenient because of the distance of the port to which 
the vessel should be brought, or when her conveyance to such a 
port would take too much tin1e or entail too great a consump-
tion of coa I. It is, we understand, even asserted that such de-
struction is justifiable when the captor has not at his disposal a 
sufficient number of men from whmn to provide a crew for the 
captured vessel. It is unnecessary to point out to your excellency 
the effects of a consistent application of these principles. They 
would justify the wholesale destruction of neutral ships taken by 
a vessel of war at a distance from her own base upon the ground 
that such prizes had not on board a sufficient amount of coal to 
carry then1 to a ren1ote foreign port-an amount of coal with 
which such ships would probably in no circun1stances have been 
supplied. They would similarly justify the destruction of every 
neutral ship taken by a belligerent vessel which started on her 
voyage with a crew sufficient for her own require1nents only, and 
therefore unable to furnish prize crews for her captures. The 
adoption of such measures by the Russian Government could not 
fail to occasion a complete paralysis of all neutral commerce. 
It appears to His :l\Iajesty's Government that no pains should 
be spared by the Russian Government in order to put an end 
without delay to a condition of things ·so detrimental to the com-
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merce of this country, so contrary to acknowledged principles of 
international law and so intolerable to all neutrals. You should 
explain to the Russian Government that His ::\Iajesty's Govern-
ment does not dispute the right of a belligerent to take adequate 
precautions for the vurvose of pre,·enting contraband of war, in 
the hitherto accepted sense of the words, from reaching the 
enemy; but they object to, and can not acquiesce in, the introduc-
tion of a new doctrine under which the well-understood distinc-
tion between conditional and unconditional contraband is alto-
gether ignored, and under which, moreover on the discovery of 
articles alleged to be contraband, the ship carrying the1n is, with-
out trial and in spite of her neutrality, subjected to penalties 
which are reluctantly enforced even against an enemy's ship 
(Parliamentary Papers, Hussia, ::\o. 1 (1905), p. 12.) 
The [{night Oo1nraander case.-The sinking of the 
[{night Oo1nmander in 1904 during the Russo-Japanese 
war has attracted general attention and caused much dis-
cussion. The [{night Commander was a British steamer 
and was captured by a Russian cruiser and sunk before 
adjudication by a prize court. 
Attitude of the United States.-In regard to the ru-
mored sinking of the /{night Oo1n.mander during the 
Russo-Japanese ·war in 1904, the United States cabled 
its representatiYes in Russia: 
DEP.ART~IENT OF STATE, 
Washington, July 30, 1904. 
(l\Ir. Loomis instructs ~Ir. Eddy to call the attention of the 
minister of foreign affairs to the treaty of 1854, and that, as 
legitimate commerce is carried on by .A.merican ships with Japa-
nese ports and the Far East, the United States Government, con-
sidering the above treaty and section 1, article 5, of the Russian 
proclamation of rules of conduct in the war between Russia and 
Japan, expects, and should the contingency arise, shall claim 
rights under that treaty or international law. 
As it is represented that the Knight CO?nm,ander was under 
American charter and was carrying American property, instructs 
him to inquire whether that vessel was sunk by the commander 
who made the seizure, and to inform the Russian Government 
that if such is the case the Government of the United States 
would view with the gravest concern the application of similar 
treatment to American vessels and cargoes, and that this Govern-
ment reserves all rights of security, regular treatment, and 
reparation for American cargo on board the Knight Commander 
and in any seizure of American vessels.) (U. S. Foreign Rela-
tions, 1904, p. 734.) 
KNIGHT COMMANDER CASE. 
Decision of Vladivostok prize court.-The sinking o£ 
the /{night Commander during the Russo-Japanese war 
in 1904 was considered by the Russian prize court at 
Vladivostok, 'vhich rendered its decision on August 3-
16, 1904. The decision gives the following statements: 
The facts of the case are as follows: On July 11/24, about 
6 a. m., a separate detachment of cruisers of the Pacific Ocean 
squadron under con1mand of Rear-Admiral Jessen, consisting 
of cruisers Rossia (flagship), Grontoboi and Rurik, while in 
latitude 34 o 21' N., longitude 138° 53' .5 E., to southwest of 
entrance to Gulf of Tokio, perceiYed a merchant steamer. Ross,ia 
gave chase, and when within 15 or 20 cables hoisted signal 
"stop," and then sent, one after another, two blank shots, then 
two projectiles under her bow as steamer continued on her course 
at full speed for entrance of Tokio Gulf. The steamer then 
stopped and hoisted British commercial flag. By order of 
commander of detachn1ent, Rossia hoisted signal ":Master con1e 
on board with papers," but as this order was not obeyed, a party 
headed by Lieutenant Favrishenko and Sub-Lieutenant Aminoff 
was sent aboard to examine stea1ner's papers and cargo. Ex-
amination proYed that J. R. Durant was master, that she was 
on voyage to Japan with cargo consisting of railway material, 
bridge rna terial, machinery, and various articles. The master 
of the steamer was not able to present any documents of his 
cargo, but examination of the holds showed that they were· filled 
with contraband exclusively, the other articles constituting an 
unimportant· portion. ~\fter examination the officers returned 
to the cruiser, bringing the master and papers along. Having 
inquired of the master why there were no bills of lading amongst 
the papers, and learning there was coal for four days only, Rear-
Admiral Jessen informed the master that the steamer was subject 
to confiscation, and as she had not sufficient coal to take her into 
a Russian port, she would be destroyed. Half an hour was 
given for removal of the crew. After removal of crew she :was 
sunk by explosion of cartridges at 9.15 a. m. On return of 
cruiser dh·ision to YladiYostok, the matter of sinking of steamer 
was submitted to the 11rize court. Exa1nination of n1aster's 
papers showed that stean1er was British register, built in Yarrow 
in 1890, of 9,620 displace1nent, 4,305 and 2,716 registered tonnage 
and speed of 11 knots. Her registry was from Liverpool, No. 
97801, and steamer belonged to Robert Low Greenshields, of 
Liverpool. From entries in log and testimony of master it was 
learned that until December, 1903, the vessel made voyages be-
tween Calcutta and other East Indian ports. In Decen1ber she 
was chartered by the Austrian Lloyd for a trip to Trieste and 
Venice. From Venice steamer chartered by an Austrian firm 
in Trieste to carry coal for machinery and priva~e cargo to ~res-
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sina, then from Palermo to load 25,000 cases of lemons and 
general cargo for New York, where the charter lapsed. In 
New York the steamer was not chartered by anyone, but grad-
ually received various cargo, and was sent by orders of the agents 
of the ship's owner to Singapore, :Manila, Shanghai, Yokohama, 
and Kobe, where this voyage was to end. In regard to the 
cargo for which the master, Durant, presented no bills of lading 
or even manifest, the court could only fonn a notion of that por-
tion addressed to Japanese ports of Yokohama and Kobe, which 
was in the steamer at time of capture. Ship's papers being 
missing, the court took the evid.ence of the two boarding officers, 
Lieutenant Fa vrishenko and Baron An1inoff, in two private 
memorandum books, presented by the latter. From the data, 
when carefully confronted one side with the other, we may 
conclude that the cargo at moment of seizure of ship consisted of 
the following articles: Rails, bridge materials, various railway 
material, steel, steel sheets, nails, wire, pipes, wheels, tar, acids, 
shovels, and a small quantity of assorted cargo consisting o:f 
paint, clothing, leather, sailcloth, tin, hardware, wood, and 
small articles, as ink, perfumery, soap. Thus it may be con-
sidered as fully proven that the Knight Commander was arrested 
by the Russian cruisers while carrying contraband of war into 
the enemy's ports. 
After examination of. the evidence the court reached 
the following conclusion: 
Therefore the court feels con dnced that the following is indu-
bitably proven. 
(1) The fact that the owner of the steamer Knight G01nmander 
having performed illegal acts, directed to make more effective 
the efforts of our antagonist by carrying to hin1 at Chemulpo, 
the theater of war directly, articles of military contraband. 
(2) The sup}1l'ession by the master of said steamer of an en-
tire file of important d.ocuments relating to his vessel and to her 
cargo as well as his undoubted knowledge that he was conveying 
articles of military contraband to the enemy; and 
(3) The presence on said steamship at the moment of being 
seized of n1ilitary contraband in quantity indubitably exceeding 
one-half of her entire cargo. 
On these grounds, and taking into consideration the actual 
facts of the present case as provided for by articles 5, 8, 13, of 
the statutes of naval prizes, the prize court finds: 
(1) That the Knight Gom1nander was arrested in a legal man-
ner in compliance with the rules enacted in articles 2, 3, 15-17 
of the statutes; and 
(2) That the said steamer having been caught conveying mili-
tary contraband to the enemy in quantity exceeding one-ha1f of 
the cargo, as well as the mentioned contraband, appear to be legal 
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prizes, and decrees to adjudge the steamer Knight Oontntander 
and the contraband cargo that was in her at the time of her seiz-
ure as subject to confiscation as legal prizes. 
Appeal from the Vladivostok decision.-In the appeal 
from the decision of the Vladivostok court to the higher 
prize court, the attorney for the owners of the steamer 
and for the o'vners of the sunken cargo concludes, on 
review of the evidence, that-
Therefore the only action that should have been taken in this 
case was to arrest the ship and bring her into the nearest Russian 
port to land the contraband, but in no case to sink the steamer. 
Under the circumstances when the steamer was arrested, taking 
her into a· Russian port presented scarcely any difficulty 'vhat-
ever; for (1) because there was on the steamer, as seen from 
the record, about 120 tons of coal, which, allowing for a ten-knot 
speed, would have been sufficient for four days, distance of nearly 
1,000 miles. \Vhereas the distance to the nearest Russian port, 
KersakoYsk or Saghalin, from Yokollarna is considered 750 miles, 
and (2) though the T"essel was stopped 15 miles off the entrance 
of the Gulf of Tokio, no enemy was seen nor was there any evi-
dence of his proximity, whereas these circumstances exactly were 
dPeined extraordinary and the steamer was sunk. The prize 
court in its decision with reference to the quantity of the cargo 
was guided by the same data as the naval authority, whereas 
had they acted in confonnity with article 71, statutes on prizes, 
by Yirtue of which in similar cases the shipper n1ust be sum-
moned by publication, in such case most probably there would 
have been at the disposal of the court a sufficient number of 
proofs of the faulty character of the decision regarding the 
quantity of cargo adjudged military contraband. 
Helying upon all the above staten1ents, I have the honor to 
ask the highest prize court to re,Toke tbe decision of the Vladi-
vostok prize court as incorrect, and to decree that the sinking 
of the Knight Oontntander was unjustifiable, and that the owners 
both of the steamer and cargo are entitled to receive ren1uneration 
for the sinking of the one and the other. 
Decision on the appeal.-The follo\ving telegram ex-
plains the action upon the appeal in the case of the 
[{night Commander.· 
AMERICAN EMBASSY, 
St. Petersburg, December 5, 1905. 
(1\fr. Eddy reports that the decision in the case of the Knight 
Oo·mmander, rendered on Saturday, maintains the finding of the 
Vladivostok prize court in regard to condemnation of the vessel 
and cargo, that the protest of 1\fr. Berline concerning neutral 
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goods was allowed, and that that matter was referred to the 
Liba u vrize court for revision under article 88, na Yal prize regula-
tions.) (U.S. Forei~ Helations, 1!)05, p. 754.) 
The article 88 above referred to is: 
88. :Matters concerning indemnification for losses ans1ng as a 
result of the d~tcntiou, dc~truction, perishing, or injury of mer-
chant vessels and cargoes are transacted in port prize courts, and 
are begun only at the instance of parties who have sustained 
losses or their agents . .J The rights of parties in the matters men-
tioned arc enjoyetl by the persons who have suffered loss, or their 
agents, and by the judge-adyocate as representative of the i_n-
tPrests of the Government. ( U. S. Foreign Relations, 190-!, p. 746.) 
Recie1c of th ~ case.- l,here is no contention that the 
condition of the !{night Oo1n11~ande1' ·was bad, that its 
value ·was extretnely ~n1nll, that there "·as danger of re-
capture, or that the distance frotn a port 'Yns great, 
though it "·as maintained that there "·as coal enough only 
for four days, and on this ground the vessel was de-
stroyed. ..A.s the court decision says: 
HaYing inquired of t he nwster why there were no bills of lad-
ing among the papers, and learning there was aboard coal for 
four days only, Rear-Admiral Jes~en informed the master that 
the steamer was subject to confiscation, and as she had not suffi-
cient coal to take llCr into a Russian l)Ort, she "\Yould be destroyed. 
Half an hour was given for removal of the crew. ..After removal 
of the crew she was sunk by explosion of en rtridges at !).15 a. n1. 
The naval officer thus constituted a "quarter-deck 
prize court " decided the neutral vessels liable to confis-
cation and destroyed vessel and cargo. 
In the case of the l{nig ht 0 ommander the prize court 
Rt \Tladivostok "ras largely 1nilitary in character, made 
up as follo"·s: ~' l\1ajor-General }(nipper, chairn1an; Cap-
tain (second rank) Sin1onoff, Lieutenant-Colonel Eger-
man, Public Councillor Stein, Collegiate Secretary Che-
borenko, Procurator Titular Councillor Lazarevsky, Col-
legiate Secretary Engelhardt, secretary." 
Reciting certain facts in regard to cargo and voyage, 
this court says, " Thus it 1nay be considered as fully 
proven that the [(night Oom1nander was arrested by the 
Russian cruisers 'vhile carrying contraband of war into 
the enemy's ports." 
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It may be noted that the articles mentioned, such as 
rails, railway 1naterial, wire, acids, wheels, clothing, 
hardware, perfumery, soap, etc., are generally regarded 
as contraband only when destined for the enemy's mili-
tary or naval use. The simple destination of such articles 
of conditional contraband nature to the ports of an enemy 
does not necessarily make them liable to capture. 
The absence, loss, or destruction of certain of the 
proper ship's papers which was set forth before the court 
is not a ground for destruction, but 1nay be ground for 
seizure of a vessel. 
The destination was not proven beyond a doubt, though 
supposed for a part of the cargo to be Chemulpo, which, 
though in l{orea, the Russian report nan1es as " the thea-
ter of war." 
That the owner of the vessel "~as involved in the 
transaction other than as a carrier is not affirmed. 
Tl-le amount of goods of various classes is admittedly 
in doubt. The nature of the cargo 'vas bulky and of 
such character as to 1nake it impossible for the visiting 
party of two or three to 1nake sure it 'vas conditional 
contraband. 
In Attorney Bagenoff's appeal fron1 the decision of the 
Vladivostok court it is clai1ned that the trial was illegal 
because-
1. The procedure 'vas irregular and the evidence in-
sufficient and ex parte. 
2. The absence of certain of the ship~s papers would, 
according to Russian instructions 18 and 20, pern1it only 
sea.rch and detention of the vessel. 
3. The exan1ination of the cargo was superficial and 
indefinite by looking through the hatchways into the 
holds, and the testi1nony of the examining officers was 
not in agreen1ent. 
Professo1' lVoolsey's opinion.-In the discussion of the 
case of the Knight Oomrnander, Professor 'Voolsey, in 
nn article appea~ing since this Situation was prepared, 
says: 
These are the considerations involved: 
(1) The injustice of penalizing a ship not shown to be guilty. 
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{2) The insufficiency of an ex parte examination of cargo at 
sea. 
(3) Yalidity of excuses for destruction. 
{4) The doctrine of conditional contraband; its application to 
this cargo. 
( 5) Is destruction eYer permissible? 
( 6) Is destruction lawful subject to com pen sa tion? 
* * * * * * * 
So far as I am aware the injustice of destruction attaching as 
a penalty to the neutral ship, eYen granting that it is carrying 
contraband, has not been sufliciently emphasized in the Knight 
Commander case. 
The argument is this: To condemn a ship carrying contraband 
it must be shown that it belonged to the owner of the contraband 
or that the contraband forn1ed so large a part of the cargo as to 
prove complicity. This is an intricate business of a highly judicial 
11ature, demanding the production of papers and examination of 
witnesses. It will be later shown what grave doubt existed as to 
the really contraband character of the cargo in question. But, 
laying this aside, the case in point shows us a penalty, namely, 
the loss of the ship, which according to the accepted rules govern-
ing contraband would not have been inflicted by any well-regu-
lated prize court, unless the owner of the ship was shown to be 
the owner of the cargo as well, as to whiCh there is no proof that 
the searching officer made inquiry. Thus we find the case to in-
Yolve an enlargement of the accepted penalties for carrying con-
traband. 
2. The vast difference between the cursory ex parte judgment 
upon all the facts in a ship's case and the judicial examination 
of the same is also to be noted as a sound reason against the prac-
tice we are considering. In port the cargo can be landed, its 
character ascertained, its destination learned, and witnesses sum-
moned in proof of all, beside that evidence which the ship's papers 
give. This trial, before a court trained to judge the credibility of 
eYidence, if properly conducted, creates so strong a presun1ption 
of guilt or innocence that few governments will venture to chal-
lenge the Yerdict. It must be admitted that the prize court of first 
instance sitting at Vladivostok seems to have been scarcely a 
judicial body it seems to haYe existed for condemnation only. 
After discussing other questions raised by the destruc-
tion of the f{ night 0 ommander, Professor \Voolsey refers 
to the distinction between " compens~tion ·paid for a 
destroyed neutral ship as implying a penalty for an un-
lawful act and compensation interpreted as the price to 
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be paid by the belligerent for destruction as a military 
necessity acting within its rights." He says: 
With this distinction clearly in mind and the jus angariae to 
justify destruction on account of the military necessity al1uded 
to by Professor Holland, it is contended that the only reason 
for exceptions to the rule disappears, and that we are justified 
in laying down as probably the usage of to-day-with the sole 
exception of Russia-that neutral ships which can not be taken 
before a court for trial must be released. If military necessity 
demands, they may be appropriated or destroyed subject to full 
payment. 
In defense of this rule are the following considerations: This 
is substantially the usage of to-day except in Russia. This is the 
opinion almost unanimous of British and American writers. 
Continental publicists, while not unanimous, are fairly favorable 
to this rule. Neutral states demand it as a reasonable measure, 
in their interest. It is a logical rule, because otherwise you are 
enlarging the penalty of carrying contraband, making ship liable 
with goods, and conferring improper judicial authority upon a 
naval officer not trained for it. If this is not the rule, yet it is a 
reasonable rule, and as it is the fashion now-a-days to say, the 
next Hague Conference should make it a rule. (16 Yale Law 
Journal, p. 567 ff.) 
Later Russian regulations.-The protests in regard to 
the sinking of the Knight Commander led to the issue of 
new orders. 
The Russian instructions of August 5, 1905, leave some 
doubt by making a distinction between " direct necessity " 
and " emergency." 
Russian vessels were not to sink neutral merchantmen with 
contraband on board in the future, except in case of direct neces-
sity, but in case of emergency to send prizes into neutral ports. 
Oase of the [{ow-Shing.-On July 25, 1894, the Kow-
Shing, a British vessel, engaged in Chinese transport 
service in the Chino-Japanese war, and having on 
board about 1,100 troops, was stopped and ordered to 
follow a Japanese war ship to port. The Chinese on 
board the transport refused to allow this. The Japanese 
war ship sunk the Kow-Shing. The action of the Jap-
anese war ship has been generally supported as an act of 
war, the transport being engaged in the military service 
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of the enemy. (Takahashi, International Law during 
the Chino-Japanese 'V ar, p. 24.) 
Professor Holland's opinion.-Professor Holland, in a 
letter to the London Times, says of the sinking of the 
Kow-Shing: 
The Kow-Shing, therefore, before the first torpedo was fired, 
was, and knew that she was, a neutral ship engaged in the trans-
port seryice of a belligerent. (Her flying the British flag, 
whether as a ntse de guerre or otherwise, is wholly immaterial.) 
Her liabilities as such a ship were twofold: 
1. Regarded as an isolated Yessel, she was liable to be stopped, 
visited, and taken in for adjudication by a Japanese prize court. 
If, as was the fact, it was practically impossible for a Japanese 
prize crew to be placed on board of her, the Japanese conu.llander 
was within his right in using any amount of force necessary to 
comiH~l her to obey. his orders. 
2. As one of a fleet of transports and 1nen-of-war engaged in 
carrying reinforcements to the Chinese troops on the n1ainland, 
the Kow-Shing was clearly part of a hostile expedition, or one 
which might be treated as hostile, which the Japanese were en-
titled, by the use of all needful force, to preYent from reaching 
its destination. The force employed seems not to have been in 
excess of what might lawfully be used, ·either for arrest of an 
enemy's neutral transport or for barring the progress of a hostile 
expedition. The rescued officers also haying been set at liberty 
in due course, I am unable to see that any violation of the rights 
of neutrals has occurred. Xo apology is due to our GoYernment, 
nor haYe the owners of the J(ow-Shing or the relatiYes of her 
European officers who may ha Ye been lost any claim for com-
pensation. I haYe said nothing about the violation by the Jap-
anese of the usages of ciYilized warfare (not of the Geneva Con-
vention, which bas no bearing upon the question) which would 
be involved by their having fired upon the Chinese troops in the 
water; not only because the evidence upon this point is as yet 
instl.fficieut, but also because the grievance, if established, 
would affect only the rights of the belligerents inter se ). not the 
rights of neutrals, with which alone this letter is concerned. I 
baYe also confined my obserYations to the legal aspects of the 
question, leaYing to others to test the conduct of the Ja~anese 
commander by the rules of chivalrous dealing or of humanity. 
Your obedient sen·ant, 
T. E. HOLLAND. 
A THEN JEUM CLUB, August 6. 
(Reprinted in Takahashi, Interna-tional Law during the Chino-
Japanese War, p. 41.) 
OPINION OF UNITED STATES COURT. 9B 
United States opinion as to court and prize.-In 1851 
the case of Jecker v. ~fontgomery in the Supreme Court 
of the United States gave rise to several questions. 
rrhis case arises upon the capture of the ship Admittance during 
the late war with :l\fexico by the United States sloop of war 
Portsmouth, commanded by Captain ~Iontgomery. 
The Ad1nittance was an American vessel, and after war was 
declared'sailed from New Orleans, with a valuable cargo, shipped 
at that place. She cleared out for Honolulu, in the Sandwich 
Islands, and was found by the Portsmouth at Saint Jose, on the 
coast of California, trading, as it was alleged, with the enemy. 
Before this capture was made, a prize court had been estab-
lished at :Monterey, in California, by the military officer exercising 
the functions of governor of that province, which had been tal{en 
possession of by the American forces. A chaplain belonging to one 
of the ships of war on that station was appointed alcalde of l\fon-
terey, and authorized to exercise admiralty jurisdiction in cases of 
capture. The court was established at the request of Commodore 
Biddle, the naval commander on that station, and sanctioned by 
the President of the United States, upon the ground that prize 
crews could not be spared from the squadron to bring captured 
vessels into a port of the United States, and the officers of the 
squadron were ordered to carry their prizes to :Monterey and libel 
them for conden1nation in the court above mentioned, instead of 
sending them to the United States. 
· In pursuance ·of this order the Admittance was carried to 
l\fonterey and condemned by the court as lawful prize, and the 
vessel and cargo sold under this sentence. The seizure at Saint 
Jose was made on the 7th of April, 1847, and the ship and cargo 
condemned on the 1st of June, in the same year . 
• • * • * * * 
All captures jure belli are for the benefit of the sovereign under 
whose authority they are made, and the validity of the seizure 
und the question of prize or no prize can be determined in his own 
courts only, upon which he has conferred jurisdiction to try the 
question,. and under the Constitution of the United States the 
judicial power of the General Government is vested in one Su-
preme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress shall from 
time to time ordain and establish. Every court of the United 
States, therefore, must derive its jurisdiction and judicial author-
ity from the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and 
neither the President nor any military officer can establish a 
court in a conquered country, and authorize it to decide upon the 
rights of the United States or of individuals in prize cases, nor 
to administer the laws of nations. 
The courts established or sanctioned in :Mexico during the war 
by the commanders of the American forces were nothing more 
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than the agents of the military power, to assist it in preserving 
order in the conquered territory and to protect the inhabitants 
ln their property and persons while it was occupied by the Ameri-
can arms. They were subject to the military power, and their 
decisions under its control, whenever the commanding officer 
thought proper to interfere. They were not courts of the United 
States, and had no right to adjudicate upon a question of prize 
or no prize, and the sentence of condemnation in the court at 
1\lonterey is a nullity, and can have no effec~ upon the rights ot 
uny party. 
• * • • • • • 
As a general rule it is the duty of the captor to bring it within 
the jurisdiction of a prize court of the nation to which he belongs 
and to institute proceedings to have it condemned. This is re-
quired by the act of Congress in cases of capture of ships of war 
of the United States; and this act merely enforces the per-
formance of a duty imposed upon the captor by the law ot 
nations, which in all civilized countries secures to the captured 
a trial in a court of competent jurisdiction before he can finally be 
deprived of his property. 
But there are cases where, from existing circumstances, the 
captor may be excused from this duty, and may sell or otherwise 
dispose of the property before condemnation ; and where the 
commander of a national ship cannot, without weakening incon-
veniently the force under his command, spare a sufficient prize 
crew to man the captured vessel, or where the orders of his 
government prohibit him from doing so, he may lawfully sell or 
otherwise dispose of the captured property in a foreign country, 
and may afterwards proceed to adjudication in a court of the 
United States. 
But if no sufficient cause is shown to justify the sale, and the 
conduct of the captor has been unjust and oppressive, the court 
may refuse to adjudicate upon the Yalidity of the capture and 
award restitution and damages against the captor, although the 
seizure as prize was originally lawful or made upon probable 
cause. (13 Howard, U. S. Supreme Court Reports, 498.) 
Opinions of writers on destruction of prize.-The 
opinions of writers upon international law show consider-
able diversity in statement. 
l{ent says: 
Sometimes circumstances will not permit property captured ·at 
sea to be sent into port; and the captor, in such cases, may either 
destroy it or permit the original owner to ransom it. (Abdy's 
Kent, International Law, p. 276.) 
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Kleen enumerates the generally claimed grounds of de-
struction of seized vessels and comments thereon: 
1 o. Que le na Yire so it si delabre, ou marche si mal par suite du 
mauvais temps, qu'il ne puisse etre tenu a flot ou remorque; 2°. 
Que, devant l'approche d'un vaisseau de guerre ennemi, le navire 
puisse etre pris par celui-ci, ou empeche de l'eYiter ou de lui 
cac·her les operations; 3°. Que le capteur manque de !'equipage 
uC•cessaire pour amariner le na vire; 4 o. Que le port so it bloqu~ 
ou trop eloigne) ou que le navire ait trop peu de valeur pour y 
etre mene; 5°. Que le capteur, etant presse, n'ait pas de loisir de 
s'occuper du na Yire. 
Aucun de ces pretextes ne soutient un examen serieux. Le fait 
qu'un capteur YOit dans les eyenements naturels, dans des risques 
pour lui-meme, dans le manque d'equipage ou dans d'autres incon-
vC•nients pra tiques, un obstacle a operer telle saisie, pent bien 
constituer pour lui-ainsi qu'il a ete generalement remarque sur-
tout en ce qni concerne des prises neutres-un motif de l'01nettre, 
mais non pas un motif de commettre une violation du droit d'un 
neutre ou un acte de pira terie. La destruction d'une propriet~ 
neutre n'est jamais nne " necessite de la guerre," car le bellige-
rant ne se defend pas par cela contre son ennemi. D'ailleurs le 
droit de la guerre repose tout entier sur la force comme seul titre 
juridique, condition sine qzul non. Le croiseur qui ne dispose pas 
de la force requise-soit en armement, en equipage, etc.-pour 
pou,·oir remplir toutes les conditions d'une ,saisie legale (protec-
tion contre l'ennemi, Hmarinage, conduite au port, direction, etc.), 
n'est plus un capteur competent. C01nn1ent un acte re1nplar;ant la 
saisie pourrait-il etre un titre d'appropria tion, alors que la saisie 
elle-meme ne I' est pas? Le croiseur qui, en pleine mer, detruit de 
la propriete privee non encore jugee et dont partant aucune preuve 
formelle n'a encore rendu manifeste le cbaractere enneini ou 
coupable, s'arroge les attributions d'un juge, qualite qui ne lui 
reYient pas. 
Sur ces fondements et d'autres semblables, la defen~e absolue de 
rlvtruire sur mer des })l'iSPS neutres est a pen unanime : une telle 
destruction est partout qualifiee de criminelle. L'interdiction se 
recontre deja pendant les guerres maritimes de la Revolution 
fran~aise-alors que tant d'autres violations des droits des neu-
tres furent ponrtant tolerees-par la regie qu'une destruction 
pareille ne pent jamais etre legitimee, tout an plus peut-elle etre 
excnsee en cas de force majeure, et encore dans ce cas, l'Etat du 
capteur doit reparation pleine et entiere aux leses. Depuis lors, 
la defense contre ces sortes de destructions est devenue s~vere. 
(2 La Xeutralite, p. 531.) 
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Lawrence 1nakes a clear distinction bet"·een the de-
struction of neutral and the destruction of belligerent 
property. 
:i\Iean"·bile it is necessary to point out that a broad liue of dis~ 
tjuction must be drawn between the destruction of euemy prop-
erty and the destruction of neutral property. The former bas 
changed owners directly the capture is effected, and it matters 
little to the enemy subject who has lost it whether it goes to the 
bottom of the sea or is divided by publie authority among those 
who have depriYed him of it. But the latter does not belong to 
tne captors till a properl~· constituted court has decided that their 
seizure of it was good in international law, and its owners have 
a right to insist that au adjudication upon their clai1u shall pre-
<'ede any further dealings with it. If this right of theirs is dis~ 
regarded, a claim for satisfaction and indemnity may be put in 
by their goYernment. It is far better for a naval officer to re-
lease a ship or goods as to which he is donbtful tllan to risk per-
sonal punishment and iuterna tional e,)mplica tions by destroying 
innocent ueutral property. EYeu where "·bat is belieYed to be 
enemy property is concerned, and destruction or _release become 
the only possible alternatives, it would perhaps be wise to adopt 
the latter unless the hostile nationality of the Yessel and owner-
ship of the cargo are too clearly established to admit of mistake. 
But the nece~~ity of rapid moYement in modern ua ,-al warfare, 
combined with the fact that neutral ports will in most cases be-
closed to prizes, is almost certain to result in an increase of the 
practice of destruction, uuless the nations will consent to take a 
further step forward and prohibit the capture of priYate property 
unless it be coutraband of war. (Principles of International Law, 
p. 406, § 215.) 
Pradier-Fodere says, after considering the generally 
enumerated grounds for the destruction of enemy private 
vessels-
En resume la pratique internationale autorise, a titre excep-
tionel, les captenrs a detruire les navires ennemi qu'ils ont cap~ 
tln·es, et la doctrine adlnet cette destruction dans les cas de 
net!essite absolue, dans les circonstances de force majeure, tout 
en reconnaissant, avec raison, que l'anneantissement d'un naYire 
de commerce desarme et consequemment n'opposant aucune 
resistance, est un acte qui excite l'horreur. On considere qu'une 
pareille pratique est une aggravation des desastres inseparables 
des hostilites dirigees contre la propriete privee, mais on la 
tolere comme une necessite fatale qui peut s'irnposer parfois, et 
uont il faut se garder de faire abus. car independamment de 
ratrocite morale d'un sernblable holocanste offert a !'interet des 
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arrnes, l'aneantisseinent de vaisseaux et de cargaisons sur une 
vaste echelle serait, au point de vue economique, suivant !'obser-
vation tres juste de de Boeck, uu fait deplorable, dont le moncle 
ci vilise subirait le contre-coup, et qui fait recnler l'humanite a ux 
plus mauvais jours de son histoire, avec la circonstance aggra-
vante que les ruines accumulees par ce systen1e de destruction 
depasseraient aujourd'hni tout ce .que les temps anciens peuvent 
offrir, etant donne le deveioppement du con1merce international 
et la puissance et la rapidite dont sont desormais doues les vais-
seaux de guerre. (8 Droit International Public, p. 659, §3185.) 
Risley states his opinion as follows: 
Where both ship and cargo have a hostile character her de-
struction is not a harsh measure, for the captor only _destroys 
what would othenvise become his own property. In two wars 
destruction has been adopted as a clelibera te po-licy-by the 
United States against Great Britain in 1812-1814, and by the 
Confederate States in the American ci\'11 war. In the latter case 
all the Confederate ports were blockaded, and they could not 
have sent in prizes if they had wanted to. 
But where the cargo, or a portion of it, is neutral property, 
destruction can only be justified in exceptional cases, on the 
ground of military necessity; if the Declaration of Paris has any 
binding value. It is impossible to reconcile a policy of systematic 
destruction applied to neutral cargoes with the provision of the 
L'eclara tion of Paris protecting neutral goods in enemy ships, 
except contraband. (The Law of War, p. 149.) 
Sir Robert Phillimore says: 
If a neutral ship be destroyed by a captor, either wantonly or 
lllHler alleged necessity, in which she herself was not directly 
involved, the captor, or his Government, is responsible for the 
spoliation. The gravest importance of such an act to the public 
service of the captor's own State will not justify its commission. 
The neutral is entitled to full restitution in value. (International 
Law, III, CCL~XIII.) 
Oppenheim, in his recent 'vork, says of the destruction 
of neutral prizes : . 
That as a rule captured neutral vessels may not be sunk, burned, 
or otherwise destroyed is as universally recognized as that cap-
hired enemy merchantmen may not as a rule be destroyed. But 
wlwreas, as shown above in §194, the destruction of captured 
enemy merchantmen before a verdict is obtained against them is, 
in exceptional cases, lawful, it is a moot question whether t~e 
destruction of captured neutral vessels is likewise exceptionally 
allowed instead of bringing them before a prize court. 
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British practice does not, as regards the neutral owner of the 
Yessel, hold the captor justified in destroying the Yessel, howeYer 
exceptional the ease may be, and howeYer meritorious the de-
struction of the Yessel may be from the point of dew of the 
goYernment of the ca vtor. I· ... or this reason, should a captor, 
for any reason wha te,·er, lut Ye destroyed a neutral prize, full 
indemnities are to be paid to the owner, although, if brought into 
a port of a prize court, c~ndemnation of ,·essel and cargo would 
haYe been pronounced beyond doubt. The rule is, that a neutral 
prize must be abandoned in case it cannot, for any reason what-
e,·er, be brought into a port of a prize court. (2 International 
Law, 4G9, sec. 431.) 
In .A.tlay's edition o£ V\Theaton's International Law IS 
the follo,ving opinion: 
If the prize 4s a neutral ship, no circumstances will justify her 
destruction before condemnation. The only proper reparation 
to the neutral is to pay him the full Yalue of the property 
destroyed. Xeutral cargoes are not always equally priYileged. In 
1870, the Desaix, a French cruiser, captured two German Yessels, 
the Ludzcig and the Voncaerts, and burnt them on the day of 
capture. Part of the cargo of these Yessels belonged to neutral 
owners (British subjects), and was therefore- under the express 
protection of the third article of the De"Clara tion of Paris. The 
owners claimed com pen sa tion for the destruction of their goods, 
but the Conseil d'Etat, in a judgment delh·ered by the President, 
of the French Republic, held that though the Declaration of Paris 
exemr}ts the goods of a neutral on board an enemy's ship from 
ccnfisca tion, and entitles the owner to their 11roceeds in case of 
u sale, yet it gh·es him no claim for damage resulting from the 
lawful capture of the shir) or from any subsequent and justifiable 
proceedings of the captors. As the destruction of the two Yessels 
was held to ha ,.e been necessary under the circumstances, no 
ccmpensation was awarded to the owners of the neutral cargo. 
( P. 507, ~cc. 359e.) 
The destruction o£ an ene1ny n1erchant vessel seized at 
sea is doubtless the easiest disposition o£ such a vessel. It 
has been argued that when such a vessel \Yould surely be 
conde1nned by a prize court, it would be lost to the enemy 
owner in any case, and its destruction at sea would be no 
greater loss to the enen1y owner, while the enemy destroy-
ing the vessel "~ould not profit by the action as when the 
vessel is taken into port and regularly condemned and 
forfeited. It is thus argued that relatively it would be 
an ad vantage to the enemy owner's state that the vessel 
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certain to be condemned should be destroyed rather than 
be forfeited to the capturing state. 
In Atlay's edition of vVheaton's International Law it 
is stated that-
If the vessel belong to the enemy, and the captor has no means 
of retaining, possession of her or of bringing her into port, he is 
then justified in destroying her, but it is his duty to preserve her 
papers and as n1uch of the cargo as he can secure. The Con-
federate cruisers burnt many of their prizes at sea during the civil 
war, as their own ports were all blockaded by the Federal fleets; 
and though this was not a proceeding to be a11proved of, it was 
not a violation of international law. (P. 50G, sec. 359d.) 
In regard to the unqualified and universal obligation 
to release a neutral Yessel, Profesor l\foore raises a ques-
tion. He says: 
Let us take, for example, the case of a neutral vessel laden 
with arms and munitions of war, which is captured by a cruiser 
of one belligerent while approaching a port of the other. Soon 
afterwards a superior force of the latter belligerent appears, .so 
that the only way to prevent the arms and n1unitions of war from 
being conducted to their hostile destination is to burn or sink the 
vessel in which they are borne. Is the captor bound under such 
circumstances practically to hand over the vessel and cargo to 
his enemy? (7 l\loore's International Law Digest, p. 523. ·i 
Professor l\1oore concludes as follows: 
The discussion between Great Britain and Russia during the 
Russo-Japanese war serves to emphasize the potentially inlpor-
tant relation of the question of contraband to the question of de-
struction. When publicists have spoken of the presence of "con-
traband " as justifying or excusing the destruction of a neutral 
ship that could not be brought in, they haYe no doubt had in mind 
cargoes composed of things specially adapted to use in war and 
confessedly contraband, such as arms and ammunition, and can-
not be assu1ned to have contemplated the subjection of neutral 
connnerce to general depredation under an extension of the ca te-
gories of contraband. (Ibid., p. 527.) 
Rules of the Institute of International Law.-After 
much discussion in earlier sessions in regard to limiting 
destruction to vessels of the enemy, the follo,ving regula-
tions 'vere adopted at the Heidelberg meeting of the 
Institute of International Law in 1887: 
SEc. 50. II sera perm is au capteur de brtiler ou de couler bas 
le na vire ennemi saisi, a pres a voir fait 11asser sur le na vire de 
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guerre les personnes qui se trouvaient a bord et decharge autant 
que possible la cargaison, et apres que le commandant du navire 
captenr aun1 pris a sa charge les papiers de bord et les objets 
importants pour l'enquete judicaire et pour le~ reclamations des 
proprietaires de la cargaison en dommages et interets dans les 
cas suivants. 
(1) Lorsqu'il n'est pas pos~ible de tenir le na vire a flot, a 
cause de son ll1auvais etat, la mer etant houleuse; 
(2) Lorsque le navire marcbe si nml qu'il ne peut pas suivre 
le na vire de guerre et pourrait facilement etre repris par l'ennemi; 
(3) Lorsque !'approche d'une force ennemie superieure fait 
craindre la reprise d u na vire saisi; 
( 4) Lorsque le na vire de guerre ne pent mettre sur le na vire 
saisi un equipage suflh:ant sans trop diminuer <~<>lui qni est 
necessaire a sa propre surete ; 
( 5) Lorsqne le port oft il f'era it possible de conduire le na vire 
saisi est trop eloigne. 
SEc. 51. II sera dresse proces-verbal de Ja tlestruction du na vire 
saisi et des motifs qui l'ont amenee; se proces-verbal sera trans-
rnis a l'a utori te Slll)Cl'ienrp lll i1 i taire et au tribunal d'instrnction 
le 11lus proche, lequel examinera et, an besoin, compH~tera les 
actes y relatifs et les transmettra au tribunal des prises. (9 
Annuaire de l'lnstitut de Droit International, 228.) 
Usual procedu1~e.-It is not easy to deter1nine :fron1 a 
superficial examination such as is usually 1nadc by a vis-
iting 'Yar vessel that destruction of an enmny merchant 
vessel 'vould not involYe serious co1nplications in conse-
quence o:f the presence o:f neutral goods on board 'vhich 
are reg~rded as exempt :fro In capture even under an 
enemy flag. 
The general principle :follo"·ed by states is to regard 
the status o:f a seized vessel as in abeyance till determined 
by the court. 
'l'he right of search is preliminary to the right of seizure, and 
tbP right of sei7-ure depends upon the result of the exercise of the 
right of search. * * * Even though there may be a legal 
se-izure, it is the duty of the seizing vessel to follow such seizure 
by affording to tbe captured party all facilities of defense to 
wbich he may be entitled. (The Nancy, 37 U. S. Court of 
Claims, 401.) 
In general any action to,vard a captured vessel in the 
'vay o:f appropriation or destruction of cargo n1nst await 
Cf)ndemna tion by the court. 
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Destruction clepriYes the neutral o£ 1nuch evidence 
,vhich he rnight other"·ise show in support o£ the inno-
cence o£ the destroyed property. 
Practical objections to destruction.-rfhere are certain 
practical considerations w·hich at the present time make 
the destruction of enemy prize a serious question. Some 
('f the considerations "·ere n1entioned in the Naval 'Var 
College Discussions ·in 1905. Such possibilities as the 
follo,Ying 'vere mentioned as 1naking destruction a clou bt-
iu] proceeding: The possibility o£ error in the decision 
of a " quarter-deck court." the lia hili ties under the pro-
vision o£ the Declaration o£ Paris exempting neutral 
goods except contraband £ron1 capture, and the fact that 
nn,varranted destruction o£ any neutral property entails 
not merely restitution of va lne but also da1nages. Cer-
ta]n practical difficulties also arise~ as was said in 1905: 
The generally enunciated rule in regard to destrnction of an 
enemy's Yessel is, " an enemy's ship ran be destroyed only after 
her crew has been placed in safety."' If this is to be strictly 
interpreted, there would be considerable doubt as to whether the 
deck of a 'var Yessel. whose commander fears that ltis prize 1~ in 
imminent danger of recapture because of the approach of his 
enemy, would he a "place of safety." It is held that the property 
and persons of belligerents are subject to the hazard of war 
when coming within the field of operations. It would scarcely 
follow that such persons should be forced to assume such hazards, 
particularly when it is a 111atter of doubt before adjudication 
by the court whether the Yessel is a proper subject for seizure. 
"\Yhat is true of the belligerent Yessel is even more emphatically 
true of a neutral Yessel. 
* * * * * * 
)fany arguments may be urged against the destruction of 
neutral \essels. Before destruction in any case, the crew, pas-
sengers, and papers must be taken from the neutral Yessel on 
board the belligerent ship. ~rhese are then immediately sub-
jected to all the dangers of war to which a war Yessel of a 
belligerent is subjected. Such a position may be an undue bard-
ship for those who have not been engaged in the ''ar and one 
to which they should not be exposed. 
A belligerent vessel, with crew, passengers, and papers of the 
destroyed neutral Yessel, n1ay enter a neutral port to which en-
trance with the vessel itself would be forbidden. This is in 
effect almost an eYasion of the general prohibition in regard to 
the entrance of prize~ bera use on board the belligerent Yessel is 
102 TREATMENT OF NEUTRAL MERCHANTlVIEN. 
the evidence upon which the decision of the prize court of the 
belligerent will be rendered. It is certain that a neutral state 
would be very reluctant to admit within its territory a belligerent 
vessel haYing on board the crew and papers of one of its own 
private vessels which the belligerent had destroyed. The bel-
ligerent vessel might thus obtain the supplies from the neutral 
which would enable it to carry to its prize court the evidence 
in regard to capture. 
It does not seem possible in view of precedent and practice 
to deny the right of a belligerent to destroy his enemy's vessel 
in case of necessity. Of course if the doctrine of exemption of 
private property at sea is generally adopted this right can no 
longer be sustained. The destruction of neutral vessels not in-
volved in the sen·ice of the belligerent is sanctioned neither by 
11recedent nor practice. (International Law Topics, NaYal 'Var 
College, 1U05, pp. 73-75.) 
Opinion of the British Co·m1nission.-Thc questions of 
capture, sending in, and destruction of private vessels 
was quite fully considered in the Report of the British 
Royal Comn1ission on the Supply of I1~ood and Raw Ma-
terial in Ti1ne of ''r ar : 
106. The only point in this connection which seen1s to demand 
special exa1nination is whether the practice ordinarily followed, 
and generally prescribed, of " sending in " a prize with a view to 
inquiry into her character and that of her cargo by a prize court 
is, in every c3se, internationally obligatory. If so, the rule must 
obviously limit the number of prizes which any one cruiser can 
capture, to any purpose. The smaller the cruiser the less will 
she be able to proY ide the prize crews necessary for " taking in " 
any large number of prizes. I~.,or this and other reasons it has 
not unfrequently hap11ened that captors haYe sunk or burned their 
prizes after a necessarily perfunctory inquiry into their nation-
ality and trade. 
107. "'\Yith reference to ships and cargoes unquestionably be-
longing to the country of the captor or of the enemy, no question 
of international duty can arise, and a belligerent is entitled to 
give its cruisers such instructions as regards the disposal of such 
ships and cargoes as it 1nay think fit. It is for the protection of 
"innocent" neuti·al property that international law insists upon 
opportunity being given for judicial examination into the facts 
of any capture in which snell property may be involved. "Send-
ing in" is, in such a case, internationall~· obligatory, when it 1s 
reasonably possible; and should the retention of the prize by the 
captor imperil his own safety, or be incompatible with the opera-
tions in which he is engaged, his proper course would seem to be 
to release her (although some national instructions n1ay be quoted 
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to the contrary), taking from her a ransom bond, if he is allowed 
to do so by the regulations of his own Govenunent. 
108. The organization of modern war ships would nppear to 
place new difficulties in the way of either " sending in " or de-
stroying prizes on a large scale. Such ships, it is said, could 
spare but few of their men, trained, as they are, for highly spe-
cialized departments of labor, to act as prize crews; nor could 
they find room on board for the crews which it would be necessary 
to ren10ve frmn prizes before proceeding to sink them. 
146. Again, engines and 1nachinery have reduced the space 
nvailahle for the personnel of warships as compared with that 
available in the days of sailing ships. A n1odern warship could 
only to a very limited extent furnish prize crews, and she would 
iiupair her fighting and steaming capacity by so doing. To some 
extent she could also accommodate crews of captured merchant-
rnen or could carry a limited number of snpernun1eraries (if such 
surplus personnel of trained officers and men should be a vail able) 
for the purpose of providing prize crews. It follows, therefore, 
that after a very few captures a warship will be face to face with 
the dilemma that she must either sink a fresh prize or must take 
it into port; and if the former alternatiYe is adopted, she must 
take the crew on board and, owing to the inconvenience which 
their presence would cause,· land them at the earliest opportunity. 
In either case tbe warship ceases to be a free operator against 
commerce. Hence modern conditions tend to limit the capturing 
po,Yer of regular war cruisers. These observations do not, how-
ever, apply to ocean trading stean1ers converted and armed for 
the purpose of attacking commerce. 
It should be added that torpedo-craft (i. e., destroyers and tor-
pedo boats) can neither spare prize crews nor accommodate any-
one above their complement numbers. If, therefore, they are em-
ployed against com1nerce, for which they were never intended, 
such craft could only compel Inerchant ships to follow them into 
port under threat of being torpedoed. l\Ioreover, these craft can 
o11ly operate within a comparatively short distance of their shore 
basis. (Vol. I, pp. 25 and 34, §§ 106-108, 146.) 
The following questions by Sir John Colomb and re-
plies by Professor Holland also appear in the minutes of 
the British Royal Commission on the Supply of Food 
and Ra\v Material in Time of ··vvar, 1905: 
6833. In your paper you refer to the limitation put by inter-
national law upon the number of prizes taken, by the necessity 
of furnishing prize crews, and of taking prizes into port?-In 
the memorandum I discuss the question whether there is a. 
limitation and how far it applies. 
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6834. Generally there is a limitation ?-There is for the pro-
tection of neutral property, but for no other purpose. There is 
the chance that neutral propert~? is inYolYed; if it were not for 
that, it would not be necessary at all. 
6835. Then, as regards the destruction of prizes, what about 
the crews on board those ships ?-They n1ust take out the crews. 
and they n1ay take out the cargoes if they lla ve time to do so. 
6836. It is against international law, then, to sink them without 
taking out the crews '?-Yes. 
6837. Therefore, that is another limitation to the power of a · 
man-of-war making seizures and destroying vessels, because it 
crowds tbe sbip?-Yes! and it takes tilue to transfer, too. 
6838. '.rherefore, there are two limitations put by international 
law: One is the necessity of furnishing a prize crew to bring 
the prize into court, and the other is that if they resolve to 
destroy her they must crowd their ship with hPr crew'?-Yes. 
There is no necessity where she is clearly enemy property to 
spare her; that is only the case where neutral property is 
invol ,·ed. 
683!1. But there is an equal obligation to save the crew. is 
there not ?-Certainly, a hvays. 
6840. Therefore, in either case that particular limitation ap-
plies?-Always. I n1ay say that the criticisn1 of the Admiralty· 
on the navy maneuvers in 1888, which I think I mentioned just 
now, was, that when they pretended to take so n1any prizes in 
such a short time, they did not allow themselves time in which 
to transfer the crews and, therefore, must be taken to haYe sunk 
them. 
Treaty provisions in regard to contraband cargo.-In 
an early treaty of the United States with s,veden and 
X orw·ay·, 1783~ it is provided in regard to the seizure of 
neutral vessels with contraband-
.And in case the contraband merchandize be only a part of the 
cargo and the master of the vessel agrees, consents & offers to 
deliver them to the vessel that has discovered them, in that case 
the latter, after receiviug the n1ercllandizes wllich are g-ood prize. 
shall immediately let the vessel go & shall not by any rueaus 
hinder her from pursuing her voyage to the place of her destina-
tion. (Art. 13.) 
Article XIII of the treaty ·with Prussia in 1799, "rhich 
is still in effect~ gives very liberal treabnent. 
And in the same case of one of the Contracting Parties being 
engaged in War with any other Power, to prevent all the difficul-
ties and n1isunderstandings that usually a rise respecting 'iner-
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chan<lise of contraband, such as arms, anunnnition, and military 
stores of eYery kind, no such articles, ca tTied in tlte vessels, or 
by the subjects or citizens of either Party, shall be dee1ned con-
traband so as to induce confiscation or condemnn tion and loss of 
Jll'Operty to individuals. Ne-rertheless it shall be lawful to stop 
such vessels and articles and detain tbem for such length of time 
as the captors think necessary to prevent the inconvenience or 
damage that Iuight ensue from their proceeding. paying however 
v reasonable con1pensa tion for the loss such arrest shall occasion 
to the proprietors, and it shall further be allo,ved to use in the 
service of the captors, the whole or any part of the rnilitarJ· 
stores so detained, paying the owners tlle full value of the san1e, 
io be ascertained by the current price at the l)lace of its destina-
tion. Bnt in the case supposed of a vessel stopped for articles of 
contraband., if the master of the vessel stopped \vill dclin~r out 
tbe goods supposed to be of contrauand nature, he shall be ad-
mitted to do it, and the vessel sllall not in tha f case be carried 
into any port, nor further detained, but shall be allowed to pro-
ceed on her voyage. 
In the treaty between the United States and Bolivia, 
1858, is the follo,ving: 
ARTICLE 19. The articles of contraband before enumerated and 
classified, which may be found in a vessel bound to an enemy's 
port, shall be subject to detention and confiscation, leaving free 
tbe rest of the cargo and the ship, that the owners of them 1nay 
dispose of them as they see proper. Xo vessel of either of the 
two nations sllall be detained on the high seas on account of 
having on board articles of contraband, whenever the n1aster, 
captain, or super-cargo of said vessel will deli Yer up the articles 
of contraband to the captor, unless the quantity of such articles 
be so great, or of so large a bulk, that they cannot be received 
on board the capturing ship without great incon-renience; but in 
this, as· well as in other cases of just detention, the vessel de-
tained shall be sent to the nearest convenient port for trial and 
judgment according to law. 
Article 18 of the Brazilian treaty of 1828 is practically 
the s~une~ as is article 19 of the Colo1nbian (N e-n· Grenada) 
treaty of 1846. 
In article 23 of the treaty 'vith Haiti of 186-! it is pro-
vided that-
If it shall appear from the certificates that there are contra-
band goods on board any such vessel, and the commander of the 
same shall offer to deli-rer them up, that offer shall be accepted, 
nnd a receipt for the· same shall be given. and the vessel shnll be 
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at liberty to pursue ller voyage unless the quantity of contra-
band goods be greater than can l>e conveniently received on board 
the ship of war or privateer, in which case, as in other cases of 
just detention, the vessel shall be carried to the nearest safe and 
convenient port for the delivery of the same . 
. A ..rticle XX of the treaty bet,veen the United States 
and Italy, February 26, 1871, states that-
In order effectually to provide for the security of the citizens 
and subjects of the contracting parties, it is agreed between them 
that all commanders of ships of war of each party, respectively, 
shall be strictly enjoined to forbear from doing any damage to, 
or committing any outrage against, citizens or subjects of the ' 
other, or against their vessels or proverty; and if said com-
manders shall act contrary to this stipulation, they shall be 
severely punished, and 1nade answerable in their persons and 
estates for the satisfaction and reparation of said damages~ of 
whatever nature they may be. 
Resume.-From the opinions, precedents, rules, treaties, 
etc., thus far stated it is evident that the treatment of 
neutral Yessels in the tin1e of war is not yet a fully settled 
question. 
Situation V relates to one aspect of this question. 
Situation V relates to the treatn1ent of neutral vessels 
loaded for the most part 'vith contraband oYertaken by 
'var vessels of the United States on the high seas when 
bound for a fortified port of State X 'vhen there is "\Var 
between the United States and State X. 
The vessels are in each case carrying contraband to the 
enemy of the United States, and in each the cargo is for 
the n1ost part contraband. 
These facts, ho,vever, do not change the status of the 
vessel unless the cargo and vessel belong to the same 
o'vner, in 'vhich case both vessel and cargo might be sub-
ject to like penalty; otherwise, unless the Yessel 'vere 
guilty of some other ofi'ense, the cargo only 'Yould be liable 
to penalty and the o'vner of the vessel 'vQuld suffer 
sufficiently in the loss of freight and the delay caused by 
the capture and prize proceedings. 
Considering these questions first upon the basis that the 
ship and cargo belong to different owners and that it is 
a si1nple act of commerce~ it may be said that in each case 
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the penalty in general would be the loss of cargo for the 
o\vner of the contraband and the loss of freight for the 
O\vner of the vessel. 
Ho\v \Vould the fact that the commanding officer of the 
force overtaking the vessel bound \vith contraband for a 
fortified port of the enemy found the vessel carrying the 
contraband unseaworthy and not able to stand a voyage 
to a port \vhere a prize court of the United States could 
sit affect the case? 
If it \Vere an enemy vessel he might as a military neces-
sity sink the vessel and cargo after removing papers and 
crew and making proper survey, but no such penalty is 
prescribed for carriage of contraband by a neutral vessel. 
1"'he commander under some treaties would be justified in 
removing the contraband from the vessel. This, in view 
of the circun1stances, would be the best course if his ship 
could accommodate such a burden. He would also as a 
military necessity be justified in destroying the contra-
band if it vvas not possible to take it on board. In all 
cases he should bring in the papers relating to the cargo 
and observe the other naval regulations relating to such 
seizure. The vessel should be dismissed. Its penalty will 
be loss of freight. 
If contraband cargo and vessel belong to the same 
owner both are liable to condemnation if sent to a prize 
court. It would, however, be exceedingly dangerous to 
allow officers occupied with the duties of war to pass 
judgment upon the relative cost of sending vessels to 
prize court as compared with the probable value of ves-
sel and cargo, little of which could be examined in 
most cases. It would also impose a very serious burden 
upon the naval officer which he probably would not care 
to assume, particularly if the field of operations was 
remote from a prize court. The only safe course is to 
take on board or, in case of necessity, to destroy the con-
ira band, retaining all necessary papers. 
If, as he overtakes the neutral merchantman, the com-
manding officer discovers that he is in danger of imme-
diate attack by the enemy, he should dismiss the mer-
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chanttnan unless he can spare a prize crew to send her in. 
He "'"ould under no circlunstanccs be justified in cotnpel-
ling a neutral, engaged in con1n1erce for which there is a 
fixed penalty~ to run additional risks of war by accom-
panying his fleet. Nor "1'ould he be justified in taking upon 
his o'vn vessel, about to be attacked, the crew and perhaps 
the passengers of the neutral vessel in order that he might 
sink the vessel. The conditions are such that he is not in 
a position to inflict the legitimate penalty on the vessel 
because of his o'vn danger. He would not on tl;lis account 
be "'"arranted in inflicting a greater penalty and in sub-
jecting neutral persons to the hazards of war. 
\Vhen the personnel of his fleet is so reduced that he 
cannot spare a crew to take the vessel in, he should dis-
miss the vessel, though he, in accordance with the treaties 
\\ ... ith certain states, may take or destroy the cargo, retain-
ing the proper papers. 
Conclusion.-(a) If the contraband cargo and the 
seized neutral vessel have different owners, the contraband 
cargo, after proper survey, appraisal, and inventory, and 
'vith consent of the master, if in accordance with treaty 
proYisions, Inay be taken, and the vesseL if guilty only of 
the carriage of contraband, should be dismissed, and the 
papers relating to the whole transaction should be for-
warded to the prize court. 
(b) If the master does not consent, the vessel and cargo 
are liable to the usual penalties for contraband trade. 
(c) If the neutral vessel and contraband cargo belong 
to the same ow·ner, the contraband cargo Inay be treated 
as in (a). The vessel, ho,YeYer, should i £ possible be 
sent to a prize court for adjudication, otherwise the vesseJ 
should be dismissed. 
(d) Destruction, on. account of military necessity, of 
a neutral vessel guilty only of the carriage of contraband 
entitles the ow·ner to fullest compensation. Before de-
struction all persons and papers should be placed in 
~afety. 
